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ABSTRACT
The article compares and contrasts the scale and composition of 
workers’ outflow and remittance flow from 1994 to 2012 at the 
national level and in East Java and West Nusa Tenggara (WNT)—
two big migrant-sending provinces. Analysis over the longer period 
gives a better understanding of contemporary characteristics of 
volatility in labor deployment. We argue that level of deployment 
is not only explained by substantive factors—such as economic 
shocks, government policy, and epidemic—but also by technical 
factors, such as the recording system. If flawed records are not 
immediately corrected, policymakers will not be well informed in 
establishing correct policy relevance. Labor dispatch to the Asian 
region outnumbered that to Middle East countries from 1994 to 2005. 
However, from 2006 onwards, the opposite happened. Evidence 
also indicated the ever-increasing number of destination countries, 
particularly when we consider the data from returned migrants 
rather than that from deployed ones. The article demonstrates the 
potential impacts of remittance on the economic development of 
sending districts. Although decreasing over time, for the period 
2006–2009, the magnitude of remittance at the district level was 
indeed higher than that at the national level. The article highlights 
the discussion on the limitation of outmigration statistics, making 
it impossible to accurately indicate the real cross-country mobility 
of the workers. 
1 Palmira Permata Bachtiar is a senior researcher at the SMERU Research Institute. 
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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of Indonesians working overseas has become one of the 
important recent development issues. Qualitative evidence even implies that one 
can now easily find Indonesians in various economies (Ananta and Arifin 2008). 
Indeed, Indonesia has been categorized as one of the biggest sending countries in 
Asia following Sri Lanka and the Philippines (Hugo 2009). Every year, hundred 
thousands of Indonesians flow overseas. Massive flow has shaped the feature of 
emigration in the last 15 years. Compared to 1994, the 2012 figure increased more 
than 300 percent: the magnitude of which is extremely difficult to manage. In 
terms of stock, moderate figures of Indonesian overseas workers amount to four 
to six million people.2
From the economic point of view, remittances make up a significant element 
of the country’s revenue. Workers’ remittances increased by 4 percent in 2012 
compared with 2011, contributing to 21 percent of gross inflows in the current 
account. In 2012, the level of remittances made up 12 percent of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows and was even higher than official aid (Table 11). Bank 
Indonesia (2013a) reported that workers’ remittances in 2012 reached USD 6.998 
million and were directly sent to the villages.
It is therefore not surprising if issues related to emigration receive 
increasing attention from policymakers as well as civil society organizations 
in Indonesia. Nevertheless, literature examining the trend and pattern of 
migration outflow has been limited, mostly because data on outmigration have 
not been collected regularly and consistently, and are not publicly accessible. 
Therefore, comparison over longer periods has been by and large nonexistent. 
Meanwhile, policy on emigration should be based on evidence underlying the 
emigration trends.
Hence, this article aims at filling the knowledge gap and understanding 
on the issue of patterns and magnitude of migration outflow as well as the 
remittance flow in Indonesia. It describes a relatively dynamic movement of 
people to various receiving countries for the sake of better welfare by remitting 
money to the family back home. Data from field work in East Java and WNT 
was brought in to add the perspectives of two big sending areas of migrant 
workers. Field work in East Java was carried out in June 2010, and that in WNT 
in November 2010.
2 The guesstimate of the total migrant stock varies from four million (Jakarta Post 2012) to six million 
(Kompas 2012).
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RECENT TRENDS IN EMIGRATION 
Not much is known about the Indonesian history of migration before the colonial 
government. The period after 1887, however, recorded the precedence of overseas 
contract laborers owing to the enforcement of permit.  
“The colonial administration, which was opposed in principle to the 
migration of laborers to other colonies, was unable to prevent the mass 
movement to Malacca.3 Neither the mandatory passport nor the agreement 
that had been drawn up with the British colonial administration in 1893 
had much impact on slowing down the migratory flow. During that year, 
it was agreed that inmigrants to Malacca coming from the Netherlands 
Indies would only be contracted for work in the British colonies and 
nowhere outside their borders. In the Netherlands Indies itself, the 
administration put strict limits on recruitment for work abroad. After 
1887 a special permit was required for such work (IS 1887: 8). Some 
recruitment was permitted on Java and every year a few thousand recruited 
labors left for agricultural estates and mines on British Borneo, Malacca, 
New Caledonia, German New Guinea, Cochin China, and Surinaam” 
(Gooszen 1999, 31).4
The formal management of migration only took place in 1970 when the 
Ministry of Labor issued Government Regulation No. 4/1970 concerning Labor 
Mobilization (Humaidah et al. 2006). The mid-1970s marked the onset of a major 
influx of foreign workers, mostly construction workers, to oil-rich countries. The 
oil boom there also created the emergence of middle class and, with that, a new 
lifestyle and demand for domestic helpers, such as housemaids, drivers, security 
officers, etc. (Naovalitha n.d). Quoting Silvey (2004), Ananta and Arifin (2008) 
said that the path of Indonesian workers to work in Saudi Arabia was opened in 
1980s alongside the onset of cooperation between the two countries. Afterwards, 
the deployment to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries shaped the overall 
emigration figures. 
Volatility of annual deployment
The emigration figures reveal volatility over time (Table 1). The first and most 
obvious fluctuation is the case in the years 1994–1997. Hugo (2000) explained 
that the government established PT Bijak—a state-owned enterprise—to send 
workers in 1994. PT Bijak competes with private recruitment agencies (PPTKIS) 
in recruiting and sending people abroad. However, PT Bijak’s documentation was 
not included in Kemnakertrans data. PT Bijak only started in 1995 to report the 
3 Malacca is the British colonies comprising the present states of Malaysia and Singapore.
4 Cochin China is the southern part of the Republic of Viet Nam in the former French Indochina.
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deployment to Kemnakertrans.5 Therefore, we suspected that the total deployment 
by PT Bijak in 1996 and prior to 1996 was accumulated in the year 1996. It was 
not disaggregated annually. This could partly explain why the trends declined 
in 1994–1995, skyrocketed in 1996, before falling again in 1997. If this was the 
case, high volatility of placement between 1994 and 1997 was only a matter of 
recording system. 
Otherwise, one can associate this fluctuation in 1996 from the labor dispatch 
to Malaysia. Compared with the 1995 figure, the deployment to Malaysia increased 
more than 10 times in 1996: from 23,909 to 321,756 people (Table 3). Quoting 
Kassim (2000), Hugo (2000) wrote that the sharp increase of workers in 1996 
included about 300,000 irregular/undocumented workers that applied for amnesty 
from the Government of Malaysia. 
The economic crisis in 1997/1998 was also said to have triggered a sharp 
heap indicating escalating tension to work abroad (Djelantik 2008; Tjiptoherijanto 
and Harmadi 2008). A village-level study by Romdiati et al. (1998) showed that 
working overseas became a survival strategy even more obviously during the 
economic crisis, with more participation of women in the labor market. Another 
study in Subang Utara and Cirebon Timur by Breman and Wiradi (2002) elaborated 
that during economic crisis, the brokers put more efforts to find prospective 
workers, particularly women, in the village to send abroad. Even the village head 
had become a broker for the private recruitment agency in the city.
5 Hugo (2000) gave illustration of the operation of PT Bijak. Quoting Setiawati (1997), he said that PT Bijak 
sent 36,247 workers to Malaysia between September 1995 and October 1996. It also placed about 9,000 
people to Korea. 
Table 1. Official deployment from 1979 to 2012
Year
Official
Deployment
Year
Official
Deployment
Year
Official
Deployment
Year
Official
Deployment
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
10,378
16,186
17,604
21,152
29,291
46,014 
55,664
68,360
61,092
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
61,419
84,074
86,264
149,777
172,157
159,995
175,187
120,886
517,169
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
235,253
411,609
427,619
435,222
295,148
480,393
293,865
380,690
474,310
2006
2007
2008a
2009
2010
2011
2012
680,000 
696,746 
644,731 
632,172 
575,803 
586,082 
494,609
Source: Hugo (2000), Depnakertrans (2009); BNP2TKI (2012); BNP2TKI (2013) 
Note: 
a BNP2TKI (2012) released different record for 2008 deployment. However, we use the version of the Ministry of 
Labor and Transmigration since it gives more details on categories of deployment. The total placement in 2008 
excludes 20,137 sailors reported by Ministry of Transportation and Marine.
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Table 1 also showed the growing tendency to work overseas took place 
between 1997 and 2000. In 2001, however, placement reduced quite sharply, but 
increased again in 2002. Why would outmigration drop after a steady increase 
in four years from 1997 to 2000? When traced domestically, we found that 
two ministries—the Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Transmigration—were 
merged in 2001. Along with this merger, the Directorate-General of Placement 
of Indonesian Workers was divided into two separate directorates-general (DG), 
namely DG Domestic Placement and DG Overseas Placement. The institutional 
change in that year most probably disrupted the recording system, although in 
reality the deployment might have proceeded normally.
The year 2003 experienced plummeting outmigration. There are some 
sources of decline. First, Malaysia imposed a new regulation suspending workers’ 
entrance. In 2002, there had been massive deportation of Indonesian workers who 
were said to have caused social and criminal problems in Malaysia (Nagib 2002). 
Deployment to Malaysia was cut down quite significantly in 2003.6 The tragedy 
during the deportation, which took quite many casualties, had set the government 
off in applying tighter rules of emigration, not only to Malaysia but also to other 
countries (Ananta and Arifin 2008). Second, 2002 marked an important path 
in emigration governance in which the Ministry of Labor and Transmigration 
(Kemnakertrans) issued Ministerial Decree No. 104A/MEN/2002 concerning 
Placement of Indonesia Migrant Workers. For the first time, the government 
imposed a quota in the placement of female domestic helpers and caregivers. 
Quota was allocated to PPTKIS based on performance and the PPTKIS-owned 
facility, such as a dormitory and training unit. While this was a good movement, 
the quota could be regarded as another source of decline in outmigration in 
2003.7 Third, early 2003 witnessed the outbreak of severe and acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in some Asian countries, in particular Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Singapore. This epidemic reduced the mobility of people in and out of the Asian 
region, including migrant workers, which made its impact certainly significant.
A case of ever-increasing outmigration occurred during the period 2004–
2008 (Table 3). This happened not only in the placement to the Asia-Pacific 
region but also to Middle East. However, workers’ deployment plunged in 2009 
as a consequence of the global financial crisis in late 2008. At the same time, 
Indonesia suspended the placement to Malaysia on June 26, 2009 and to Kuwait 
on September 14, 2009 (Ahniar and Pratomo 2011; Ari 2011). Moratorium to 
Malaysia was ordered following the increasing abuse of workers, particularly 
6 Indeed, massive repatriation took place twice: in 2002 and 2004 (Humaidah et al. 2006). However, the impacts 
of official deployment to Malaysia were only distinctive in 2003 and it recovered in the following years.
7 The quota system did not last long. It was immediately forgotten as soon as Law No. 39/2004 was issued. The 
law stipulated nothing of such system.
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the death of Munti binti Bani (Maulia 2009). Meanwhile, workers in Kuwait 
suffered not only from low salary (USD 140 per month instead of USD 200 per 
month that the government had proposed) but also from being moved to various 
employers (Andrian 2011). All together, the credit crunch and the moratorium left 
a significant impact on total deployment in 2009. 
Afterwards, the statistics of regular/documented placement reveals no 
significant recovery. On July 29, 2010 the government banned dispatch to Jordan 
as a consequence of low salary and lack of social protection (Maruli 2011). 
Furthermore, suspension was also imposed on deployment to Saudi Arabia on 
August 1, 2011 following the beheading of Ruyati, a female domestic helper, and 
to Syria on August 9, 2011 due to increasing political tension (Hariyanti 2011; 
The Jakarta Post 2012).
The impact of the moratorium is observable in Tables 2 and 3. The dispatch 
to two biggest host countries—Malaysia and Saudi Arabia—was cut back by half 
in 2010 and 2011, respectively. The data demonstrated that the effect on Jordan 
and Syria was more dramatic compared with Kuwait implying deployment of 
Jordan and Syria was strongly dominated by female domestic helpers. 
However, doubt was cast on the effectiveness of the moratorium. No less 
than the head of the National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) echoed that one of the negative effects of the 
moratorium was the increasing number of careless prospective migrants and 
unscrupulous middlemen. These migrants evaded the suspension to Saudi by 
departing from Batam to Singapore or Malaysia before flying to Saudi (Bukhori 
2011c; Toha 2011).
Comparison of outflow to main destinations
Table 3 presents much older statistics of overseas employment as kept by Hugo 
(2000). The data enable us to compare the composition of Malaysia and Singapore 
on the one hand and the Middle East on the other. 
Table 2. Deployment to countries with moratorium
Official Deployment Moratorium to Send
Female 
Domestic Helpers 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Malaysia
Kuwait
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
187,123
29,218
11,155
234,644
0
123,886
23,041
10,932
276,633
1,155
116,056
563
5,695
228,890
6,381
130,134
4,733
0
137,097
5,952
134,023
2,518
0
40,655
1
26 June 2009
14 September 2009
29 July 2010
1 August 2011
9 August 2011
Source: BNP2TKI (2012; 2013)
Note: BNP2TKI (2013) substantially corrected the figures in BNP2TKI (2010), particularly for Malaysia in 2008, 
Kuwait in 2011, Jordan in 2011, and Syria in 2011.
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Table 3. Overseas migration of Indonesian workers (1979–2012)
Malaysia Malaysia and 
Singapore
Total Asia 
Pacific
Saudi Arabia Gulf
Countriesb
Others
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008a
2009
2010
2011
2012
41,712 
23,909 
321,756 
36,248 
132,950 
169,177 
191,700 
74,390 
152,680 
89,439 
127,175 
201,887 
219,658 
222,198 
187,123 
123,886 
116,056 
130,134
134,023
720
564
1,550
7,801
5,597
6,034
6,546
20,349
7,916
6,614
18,488
38,688
51,631
62,535
38,453
57,390
46,891
352,991
71,735
173,995
204,006
217,407
108,314
168,751
95,542
136,306
226,974
248,319
259,694
208,930
156,963
155,679
169,756
175,579
74,769 
71,477
381,349
102,810
230,839
271,287
305,695
178,496
238,364
109,893 
160,987 
297,291 
326,678   
351,682 
311,518 
256,773 
267,852 
332,783
351,145
96,533
43,521 
127,137 
121,965 
161,062 
131,157 
114,067 
99,224 
213,603
171,038 
203,446 
150,235 
281,087
257,217 
234,644
276,633 
228,890 
137,097
40,655
7,651
11,231
11,484
9,595
18,691
35,577
45,024
45,405
49,723
50,123
60,456
41,810
88,726
96,772
102,357
98,710
48,355
135,336
131,734
179,521
154,636
129,168
116,597
241,961 
183,770 
219,699 
177,019 
353,179 
343,319 
333,109 
375,300 
307,432 
217,744
116,847
2,007 
4,391 
4,570
3,756
5,003
4,403
4,094
2,606
3,453
4,682
5,130
5,766
9,420
12,850
19,185
1,708
1,054
484
709
1,249
1,696
359
55 
68
202
4
-   
143
1,745
104
99  
519
35,555
26,617
Sources: Hugo (2000); Depnakertrans (2009); BNP2TKI (2012; 2013)
Notes:  
a BNP2TKI (2012) released different records of 2008 deployment. However, we use the version of Depnakertrans 
since it gives more details. The total placement in 2008 excludes 20,137 sailors reported by the Ministry of 
Transportation and Marine.
b The values for 1994–2011 include Africa.
From 1979 to 1993, the average share of the two Southeast Asian 
countries—Malaysia and Singapore—accounted for 21 percent while that of the 
Gulf countries was 67 percent. In longer periods, from 1979 to 2012, the average 
share of workers’ placement to Malaysia and Singapore amounted to 30 percent 
while that to the Gulf countries decreased to 55 percent. Compared to the figures 
in 1979, the outflow to these two Asian countries some decades later moved 
significantly closer to that of the Gulf countries. During the period 1994–2012, 
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the statistics of Malaysia and Singapore was even higher, which was 38 percent 
compared to 45 percent of the Gulf countries.
This was explained by decrease in deployment as a consequence of 
moratorium as well as global financial shock in the period 2009–2011. While 
moratorium was enforced to both Malaysia and some Middle East countries, 
its impacts were harsher to the latter simply because of higher dependence on 
deployment of female domestic helpers. In the case of Malaysia, the impact 
of moratorium could be counterbalanced by the steady dispatch of male 
plantation workers.
The period covering 1994–2012 revealed that Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
have been two major destinations within the Asia-Pacific region and the Gulf 
countries, respectively. Particularly in 1994, workers’ dispatch to Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia contributed 56 percent and 98 percent to their corresponding regions, 
respectively; and 24 percent and 55 percent to total dispatch in 1994, respectively. 
However, the magnitude of deployment of these two countries in their respective 
regions as well as in total deployment seemed to decrease over time. Malaysia 
reached the lowest share of 38 percent to Asia-Pacific in 2013 and 20 percent 
to total deployment in 2009 and 2010. Meanwhile, the contribution of workers’ 
heading for Saudi Arabia compared to the Gulf countries and to total deployment 
in 2012 fell to 35 percent and 8 percent, respectively. 
Changing destination: Asia vs. the Middle East
With regard to some Southeast Asian countries, Wickramasekera (2002) concluded 
that there existed a changing destination of Asian workers: from predominantly 
Middle East to intra-Asian countries. He observed the deployment data from the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand over the period 1990–1997. In 1990, the 
dispatch to Asian countries was only a third of the dispatch to the Middle East. In 
1995, labor movement heading for East Asia was the same with the Middle East, 
and finally in 1997, the number of workers in East Asian destinations was higher 
by 15 percent compared to that in the Middle East.
We compared Wickramasekera’s conclusion with Indonesia in the 
period 1994–2010 by establishing the general trend (Figure 1). We took seven 
countries in Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea, and Japan) and seven Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Jordan). The trend divides the data into two parts: 
the period from 1994 to 2006 when the slope of the Asian countries was above 
that of the Arab countries, and the period afterward from 2006 to 2010 when 
the opposite took place. 
If we look closer at Table 3 we see a higher flow of workers to Asia instead 
of the Middle East, particularly from 1998 to 2002. This was most probably 
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Figure 1. Trend of Indonesian outmigration to Asia-Pacific and Middle East (1994–2010)
Sources: Depnakertrans (2009); BNP2TKI (2012, 2013)
because following the crisis, it became much cheaper to get to the neighboring 
countries than to the Middle East. The data showed that labor dispatch to 
Malaysia, Brunei, Hong Kong, and Taiwan increased while that to Saudi, 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait decreased. This was similar to the 
observation of Wickramasekera (2002). Our field findings in East Java and WNT 
demonstrated that even within one country, for example, Malaysia, the plantation 
sector demanded more Indonesian workers while the construction sector laid 
them off. Moreover, 2005 marked the trend of changing destination from Asia 
to the Middle East, which was different from the prediction of Wickramasekera 
(2002). In general, fluctuation to Asia from 2002 onward was more obvious than 
that to the Middle East. 
However, if we add the trend to cover the years 2011 and 2012, the trend 
changed significantly. With a dramatic drop of deployment to Middle Eastern 
countries, the trend in both regions became two parallel lines (Figure 2). It is then 
very difficult to establish the trend due to high volatility in annual deployment. 
More diverse destination countries
Increasing deployment of Indonesian workers over time was also accompanied by 
increasing number of destination countries. From 1994 to 1998, the destination 
economies in Asia-Pacific were limited to Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. In the Middle East, only two countries were 
known to demand workers from Indonesia: Saudi and UAE. However, the period 
following the economic crisis saw a rising number of countries in the Middle 
East that hired Indonesian laborers. For example, following the economic crisis, 
Kuwait began to recruit bulk of the workers in 1998; Bahrain and Qatar followed 
in 2001; and Oman and Jordan in 2002. By 2006, the number of countries in 
the Middle East and Africa requiring Indonesian workers had expanded to 
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Sources: Depnakertrans (2009); BNP2TKI (2012, 2013)
Figure 2. Trend of Indonesian outmigration to Asia-Pacific and Middle East (1994–2012)
include Saudi, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Cyprus 
(Depnakertrans 2009). 
Starting 2007, the list of receiving countries became longer with 34 
new economies in addition to 22 old economies (Table 4). When referring to 
data from the returned migrants that BNP2TKI collected from 2008 to 2011, 
Table 4. Old and new host economies from 2007 to 2009 
based on deployment statistics
Asia and the Pacific Middle East and Africa Europe
Malaysia*
Taiwan*
Hong Kong*
Singapore*
Brunei Darussalam*
South Korea*
USA*
Japan*
Macau*
Trinidad
China
Maldives
Palau
Saipan
Timor Leste
Australia
Cayman Island
Canada
New Zealand
India
Thailand
Saudi Arabia*
UAE*
Kuwait*
Qatar*
Yordania*
Oman*
Bahrain*
South Africa*
Yemen
Libya
Syria
Nigeria
Algeria 
Seychelles
Congo
Zambia
Mauritania
Turkey
Angola
Italy*
Spain*
Netherlands*
Germany*
UK*
Gibraltar
Rumania
Czech
Cyprus
Ireland
Monaco
Poland
Greek
Russia
Mauritius
Slovakia
Note: * old economies
Source: BNP2TKI (2010)
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we found even more host countries (old and new economies) totaling 117 
(Appendix 1). 
The increasing number of destination countries certainly brings additional 
burden to the government in managing overseas workers. Government has to 
devise protection measures, such as an evacuation procedure for migrants working 
in the African countries that are vulnerable to war and political instability. This 
was the case in Egypt in early February 2011 and in Libya in early May 2011 
when the government had to rush to save workers from being trapped in political 
conflict (Bukhori 2011a; 2011b). 
WORKERS DISPATCHED FROM SUBNATIONAL LEVELS
Table 5 outlines the data from the subnational level. We discuss this table to 
emphasize again that volatility of outmigration could be a matter of recording 
system. Table 5 was developed from the report of the Agency for Placement and 
Protection Services of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BP3TKI) at the provincial 
level. However, it does not necessarily reflect the real outmigration from the 
corresponding province. For example, majority of migrants is recorded to 
come from Jakarta, but it does not mean that it is the biggest sending province. 
Meanwhile, the importance of West Java—with Bandung as the capital city—as 
a major sending province is not noticeable in the statistics. In 2009, for instance, 
BP3TKI Bandung did not register any migrant.
In fact, majority of migrants heading for the Middle East register in Jakarta. It 
is also true that majority of private recruitment agencies for Middle East is located 
in Jakarta.8 Thus, Table 5 simply shows the migrants whose documentations are 
processed through BP3TKI. It does not imply number of migrants originated from 
the provinces.
Table 5 also demonstrated volatility of outmigration from Jakarta, which 
grew twice in 2006 compared to 2005, in line with increasing outmigration to 
the Gulf countries (Table 3) but sharply decreased in 2009. This trend needs 
to be interpreted carefully. The decrease can be explained by the fact that 
majority of migrants heading for the Gulf countries in 2009 registered through 
Kemnakertrans instead of BP3TKI Jakarta. Dual registration took place following 
the establishment of BNP2TKI in 2008, through BP3TKI and Kemnakertrans. 
In Table 5, volatility of migrants registered in BP3TKI Medan and BP3TKI 
Pekanbaru was also noticeable. Medan and Pekanbaru used to be the closest transit 
areas to Malaysia and Singapore. However, their importance diminished after the 
establishment of BP3TKI Tanjung Pinang in 2007. Migrants who used to report in 
BP3TKI Medan and Pekanbaru simply shifted to BP3TKI Tanjung Pinang. 
8 The Saudi Embassy only issues visa to domestic helpers who have gone through training sessions and acquired 
skill certificate, and eventually acquired passport from the Immigration Office in Tangerang (near Jakarta). 
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Table 5. Official deployment at the national and provincial levels (2006–2009)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Medan a)
Pekanbaru
Palembang
Jakarta
Bandung
Semarang
Yogyakarta
Surabaya
Pontianak
Banjarbaru
Nunukan
Makassar
Mataram
Kupang
Tanjung Pinang b)
Non-BP3TKI
Indonesia
20,284 
36,708 
1,858 
209,454 
1,510 
7,774 
2,687 
56,033 
2,823 
615 
83,393 
1,454 
42,061 
7,656 
-
-
474,310 
25,563 
43,516 
3,844 
414,391 
11,256 
11,811 
5,362 
40,744 
2,571 
1,699 
69,966 
704 
39,958 
8,224 
-
391 
680,000 
11,322 
5,277 
3,135 
388,902 
13,076 
29,106 
4,829 
59,041 
4,831 
1,921 
72,439 
1,622 
45,880 
10,028 
37,375 
4,653 
696,746 
14,429 
4,629 
2,784 
314,378 
16 
25,583 
5,137 
59,525 
2,859 
1,471 
29,490 
2,141 
52,273 
10,966 
26,404 
92,156 
644,731 
10,938 
2,730 
1,655 
89,043 
-   
25,620 
3,963 
46,418 
2,516 
-   
6,554 
4,929 
53,731 
7,499 
12,957 
361,057 
632,172 c) 
Source: BNP2TKI (2012)
Notes:
a) Including BP3TKI Aceh
b) Including BP3TKI Kuala Tungkal
c) Including 2,252 migrants of G to G scheme
Outmigration from East Java and West Nusa Tenggara
The data show that the global crisis has affected East Java and West Nusa Tenggara 
differently. We can observe the differences, particularly in 2009, in terms of the 
outflow to certain destination countries as well as certain occupations.
In 2006–2009, the employers of East Javanese migrants were dominated 
by various Asian countries—Malaysia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Brunei (Table 6). Only minority of workers worked in the Middle East. Over the 
years from 2006 to 2009, the total outflow increased and fell sharply in 2009. 
Major contributor to this drop was the dispatch to Malaysia which amounted to 
43 percent in 2009 compared to 2008. Two reasons were the credit crunch in late 
2008 which hit Malaysia and the issue of moratorium on domestic helpers in June 
2009. Being the biggest users of workers, any shock related to Malaysia would 
have huge impact in workers’ deployment. There was a decrease in deployment to 
Brunei in 2009 responding to a lower demand of workers. Brunei also experienced 
crisis as Brunei was the main exporter of oil. However, this reduction had a 
minimal impact since Brunei was not the major importer of workers from East 
Java. Fortunately, workers’ demand by other main destinations—Hong Kong and 
Taiwan—was relatively stable.
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Table 6. Destinations of East Javanese migrants (2006–2009)
Destination 2006 2007 2008 2009
Malaysia
Singapore
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Macau
Brunei
Middle East
Others
Total
25,868
2,306
13,159
9,316
- 
7,602
295
1
58,547
27,500
2,909
13,446
8,738
39
5,834
582
- 
59,048
26,746
3,454
13,616
11,842
213
2,898
656
100
59,525
15,379
3,706
14,226
12,020
236
1,720
858
25
48,170
Sources: UPTP3TKI Jawa Timur (2010), BP3TKI Mataram (2010)
Table 7. Destinations of West Nusa Tenggara migrants (2006–2009)
Destination 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Malaysia
Other Asia
Saudi Arabia
Other Middle East
Total
32,196 
459 
9,047 
365 
42,067 
26,963 
108 
16,493 
372 
43,936 
25,145 
27 
17,409 
553 
43,134 
29,831 
105 
21,946 
331 
52,213 
33,111 
72 
19,752 
796 
53,731 
Sources: UPTP3TKI Jawa Timur (2010), BP3TKI Mataram (2010)
The outmigration from West Nusa Tenggara has been increasing over 
the period of 2005–2009 (Table 7). Similar with East Java, Malaysia made 
up the biggest chunk of total dispatch while Saudi Arabia came second. The 
dispatch to Malaysia witnessed significant decrease from 2005 to 2007 and 
only recovered in 2008 and 2009. On the contrary, dispatch to Saudi Arabia 
increased dramatically. The growth of workers to Saudi was 83 percent in 2006, 
6 percent in 2007, and 26 percent in 2008. In 2009, number of Saudi workers 
fell by 10 percent but was balanced out with 11 percent increase in number 
of workers to Malaysia. West Nusa Tenggara did not, therefore, suffer from 
the impact of global financial crisis. Neither did it bear the consequence of 
Malaysian moratorium of domestic workers since the workers in Malaysia were 
predominantly male working in plantations.
Table 8 shows occupation pattern in East Java and West Nusa Tenggara. 
With Malaysia and Saudi Arabia as two main destinations (Table 7), two main 
occupations of West Nusa Tenggara migrants are strictly segregated: plantation 
workers in Malaysia and domestic helpers in Saudi Arabia (Table 8). This is 
in contrast to East Java workers whose dominant occupation is in construction 
and industry and increasing numbers of caregivers, which did not appear as the 
occupation of West Nusa Tenggara workers. 
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Since the impact of global financial crisis on agriculture was not as 
immediate as that on construction and industry, the total placement in West Nusa 
Tenggara did not share the same pattern with that in East Java.
District-level data
Resembling the pattern at the national and provincial level, migration outflow at 
the district level demonstrates an increasing trend from 2006 to 2008 (Table 9). 
From 2008 to 2009, however, the districts had a different experience.
Total worker outflow in Blitar and Lombok Barat in 2009 dropped by 
18 percent compared with the previous year, bringing these districts to a level 
lower than the 2006 figure. The opposite happened to Ponorogo and Lombok 
Tengah, with both sharing the experience of West Nusa Tenggara province where 
total sending of workers continued to grow following the credit crunch in 2008. 
Overseas employment in Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah in 2009 grew at the rate 
of 3 percent compared to 2008.
Table 9 also highlights the strong influence of Lombok Tengah in dictating 
the provincial overseas employment figure. In 2009, for example, Lombok Tengah 
made up 32 percent of total placement in West Nusa Tenggara. The three remaining 
districts—Blitar, Ponorogo, and Lombok Barat—only contributed 9–10 percent to 
their respective province in the same year. According to UPTP3TKI Jawa Timur 
(2010), Blitar and Ponorogo Districts were among three biggest contributors to 
Table 8. Occupations of East Java and West Nusa Tenggara migrants (2006–2009)
2006 2007 2008 2009
EJ WNT EJ WNT EJ WNT EJ WNT
Domestic helper
Agricultural worker
Caregiver
Factory and
  construction worker
Total
21,054
30,638
4,499
2,356
58,547
16,912
26,151
0
873
43,936
25,853
745
0
32,450
59,048
18,124
24,214
0
796
43,134
30,743
1,312
0
27,470
59,525
22,393
29,429
0
451
52,273
22,142
16,600
9,255
173
48,170
20,646
32,894
0
191
53,731
Sources: UPTP3TKI Jawa Timur (2010), BP3TKI Mataram (2010)
EJ – East Java; WNT – West Nusa Tenggara
Table 9. Placement of migrants in four districts (2006–2009)
 Blitar Ponorogo East Java
Lombok 
Barat
Lombok 
Tengah
WNT
2006
2007
2008
2009
5,518
5,103
6,082
5,000
3,401
3,993
3,974
4,432
58,547
59,048
59,525
48,170
6,571
5,866
6,887
5,636
14,095
13,406
16,418
16,989
43,936
43,134
52,213
53,731
Source: UPTP3TKI Jawa Timur (2010), BP3TKI Mataram (2010)
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East Java placement. However, their role becomes less important compared with 
the sum of other 36 districts all together.
REMITTANCE FLOWS
The contribution of migrants in terms of remittances is noteworthy (Table 10). 
Despite the declining stock of migrant workers in 2007, remittance still recorded 
greater inflows. Apparently, this was due to improving salary rates in several 
Asian countries, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Macau, and in Middle East 
countries (Bank Indonesia 2009). The milder impact of the crisis was also due to 
the fact that the workers who were laid off by the factories in some East Asian 
countries were still given opportunity to search for work before their visa expired 
and, hence, workers were still able to remit money back home during the global 
financial crisis. This was the qualitative evidence drawn from interviews with 
former overseas workers in East Java. 
Compared to other balance-of-payment (BOP) indicators with higher 
volatility, workers’ remittances demonstrated steadier growth over time (Table 
11). In fact, when most indicators experienced significant contraction in 2009, 
workers’ remittances remained stagnant. Consequently, the contribution of 
remittances increased in 2009, making up 32 percent of FDI inflow and the export 
of oil and gas, and 30 percent of current account inflows. This implies insignificant 
Table 10. Remittance flows to Indonesia (USD million) from 1992 to 2011
Year Remittance Migrant Stock (People)
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
229.00
346.00
449.00
651.00
796.00
725.00
958.00
1,109.00
1,190.00
1,046.00
1,259.00
1,489.00
1,699.00
5,296.00
5,560.25
6,003.82
6,617.93
6,617.62
6,730.79
6,735.88
6,998.00
925 
4,248 
4,679 
     4,337 
     4,445 
     4,385 
     4,201 
     4,088 
4,022
Source: Bank Indonesia (2009, 2013a) 
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impact of the global financial crisis on remittances at the national level despite 
reduction in migrant stock (Table 10).
Unfortunately, following the moratorium to major destination countries 
since 2009, the estimate of migrant stock further decreased in 2010 and afterwards 
impacting the remittances which only grew insignificantly. Nevertheless, the value 
of remittances was greater than the amount of the official aid. Due to continuous 
reduction in aid since 2005, its level became less than half the estimate of workers’ 
remittances in 2012. 
However, there were doubts on the importance of remittances. Some 
scholars, for example Ananta (2009), argue that remittances might not be 
significant for Indonesia. He based his argument from the Migration and 
Remittances Factbook (World Bank 2008) which compiled data for, among 
others, top remittance-receiving countries. India, China, Mexico, Philippines, and 
France were mentioned as the top recipient countries of recorded remittances in 
2007. However, small countries such as Tajikistan, Moldova, Tonga, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Honduras were the largest recipient countries taking into account 
remittances as share of the gross domestic product (GDP). Ananta (2009) argued 
that remittance might not be significant for Indonesia since it only contributed 1.6 
percent of GDP in 2006. He maintained that this contribution is much lower than 
that of the Philippines’ which reached 13 percent of GDP in the same year.
At the district level, the magnitude of remittance is indeed very significant. 
In the districts where most migrants originate, remittances certainly help 
Table 11. Workers’ remittances and other balance-of-payment indicators (in USD million)
Year
Workers’
Remittances
(Inflow)
Export of 
Oil and 
Gas (FOB)
FDI in 
Indonesia 
(Inflow) *
Services, Income, 
and Current 
Transfer**
Official Aid 
(Program and 
Project Aid)
Share of
Remittances***
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1,046 
1,259 
1,489 
1,699 
5,296 
5,560 
6,004 
6,618 
6,618 
6,735 
6,736 
6,998 
12,560 
12,858 
15,234 
16,285 
20,243 
22,950 
24,872 
31,720 
20,616 
28,659 
38,067 
35,571 
2,295 
5,163 
3,164 
10,336 
15,218 
14,111 
19,121 
23,683 
20,810 
33,224 
45,280 
56,546 
15,795 
15,690 
16,456 
16,473 
21,257 
20,186 
22,757 
26,191 
22,317 
26,227 
30,843 
33,751 
2,482 
2,299 
1,837 
2,519 
2,598 
3,588 
4,004 
4,944 
5,529 
5,375 
3,428 
3,332 
7
8
9
10
25 
28 
26 
25 
30 
26 
22 
21 
Source: Bank Indonesia (2009, 2013b)
Notes: 
*Gross inflow of foreign investment
** Including workers’ remittances
*** Compared to services, income, and current transfer
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the households cope with daily expenses and provide them with investment 
alternatives. For example, at village-level focus group discussions (FGDs), 
remittances were always mentioned as the element of international migration 
with positive impact on the family and the neighborhood. It was unanimously 
stated that overseas migration had enabled the family to improve their welfare, 
send the children to school, renovate their home, acquire a farmland, and start 
a small business. With remittances, migrants were able to contribute to building 
and renovating the nearby mosque, and to help the community financially when 
needed. Indirectly but ultimately, remittances help the migrants gain higher social 
status in the village.
To see the magnitude of remittance at the district level, we show its 
comparison with some social economic indicators in 2006. 
Table 12 shows the ratio of remittance to gross regional domestic product 
(GRDP) at the district level is also much higher than the national level, which 
is 1.6 percent (Ananta 2009). The magnitude, however, decreased over time, 
particularly for Blitar and Ponorogo where the value of formal remittance slightly 
decreased while the GRDP and local government expenditure increased. Similarly, 
ratio of remittance to District Government Budget can also give us insight on the 
magnitude of remittance at the district level. Interestingly, Lombok Tengah was the 
only district with the lowest value but highest increase of remittance from 2006 to 
2009. At the same time, its migrant outflow magnitude was the highest (Table 9).
Although Ponorogo experienced a drop in the value of remittances in 2009 
compared with 2008, Blitar suffered even more with a continuous slump over 
the last three years (Table 13). Only districts in West Nusa Tenggara, particularly 
Lombok Barat, thrived in their worker remittances.
Table 12. Magnitude of remittance and migrant outflow at the district level
Blitar Ponorogo
Lombok 
Barat
Lombok Tengah
Remittance/GDRP (%)
2006
2007
2008
2009
n a 
2.39
1.83
1.06
n a
3.41
3.17
2.72
10.68
6.37
6.80
11.11
0.25
0.24
0.29
0.27
Remittance/Local
government expenditure 
(%)
2006
2007
2008
2009
n a
27.67
28.27
12.40
n a
27.28
29.49
22.31
74.03
46.07
58.43
82.59
1.43
1.28
2.74
1.56
Migrant outflow/1,000 
people
2006
2007
2008
2009
5
5
6
5
4
4
4
5
8
7
8
9
17
16
19
20
Sources: Kantor Bank Indonesia Kediri (2008, 2009, 2010); Kantor Bank Indonesia Mataram (2010); BPS (2010)
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Table 13. Remittances in Blitar, Ponorogo, Lombok Barat, and Lombok Tengah 2007–2009 
(Rp million)
Blitar Ponorogo Lombok Barat Lombok Tengah
2007
2008
2009
207,544.00
184,621.00
117,222.11
170,422.00
184,075.00
179,135.00
237,503.39
289,509.81
394,589.04
7,211.17
10,250.56
10,876.63
Source: Kantor Bank Indonesia Kediri (2008, 2009, 2010); Kantor Bank Indonesia Mataram (2010)
Contrasting facts, however, are clearly observable in comparing Table 
13 and Table 9. Lombok Barat registered a spectacular amount of remittances 
despite lower contribution to total provincial outmigration. On the contrary, 
the highest worker outflow of Lombok Tengah was reflected on its remittance 
values. Indeed, remittance of Lombok Tengah was the lowest compared with 
the other three districts.
The reason behind this fact was that most workers of Lombok Tengah had 
completed their administrative requirements, including opening a bank account 
in Lombok Barat and Mataram City prior to their departure. Most probably, their 
home address was registered under the location of their bank account. 
Otherwise, there was a middlemen factor in the pattern of remittances. 
Our field visit demonstrated the important role of middlemen in the emigration 
process.9 An interview with an officer of a private recruitment agency and with 
a nongovernment organization (NGO) activist revealed that the workers trust the 
middleman so much that they even used the middleman’s bank account to channel 
their wages to their families.10 In West Nusa Tenggara, this is known as account 
taxi (in Indonesian “ojek rekening”). Under this system, the workers do not have 
to open bank accounts and therefore are free from monthly administration fees. 
Whenever they use the middleman’s account they will be charged certain fees. 
Most probably, the bank account of the middlemen is located in Lombok Barat 
and Mataram City and therefore remittances are booked here, rather than in 
Lombok Tengah where most workers reside.
Moreover, based on an interview with an official in Bank Indonesia 
Mataram Office, we found out that the statistics of remittances in West Nusa 
Tenggara was only based on remittance reports from the banks.11 Remittance 
9 The role of middlemen is more important in West Nusa Tenggara than in East Java. In East Java, the private 
recruitment agencies put banners in front of their office, attracting the workers to come to the office directly in 
order to get some money. Apparently, agencies in East Java intend to cut the use of middlemen. In West Nusa 
Tenggara, on the contrary, the private recruitment agencies even encourage the workers to use the service of 
the middlemen. In an FGD among men in West Lombok, a respondent said that he once tried to come to the 
office of the recruitment agency by himself. The officer of the agency, however, said that he needed to go to the 
middleman first before coming to the office.
10 Interview with Ahmad (male, about 55 years old) on October 26, 2010; interview with Budi (male, about 30 
years old) on November 3, 2010
11 Interview with Bank of Indonesia officer in Mataram: Sony (male, 28 years old) on October 25, 2010
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reports from Western Union located at the post office were not included. This was 
different from statistics in East Java where all offices of Bank Indonesia had built 
a partnership with the post office to incorporate their remittance reports.
With further data collection from Western Union officers, we received 
information that remittance transfer through Western Union has been very high.12
Table 14 compares remittance values channeled through Western Union 
in post offices and through banks. More importantly, Western Union data 
demonstrated increasing values of remittances over time from October 2009 to 
September 2010, while remittances sent through banks tended to decrease. This 
implies that overseas workers are more interested in sending their money home 
through nearby post offices. With this table, we recommend Bank Indonesia 
Mataram Office to consider integrating the reports from Western Union Post 
Office into its monthly remittance report. 
Finally, low remittance values sent to Lombok Tengah through formal 
channels can also mean that workers in Lombok Tengah prefer informal channels, 
for example, through hand carry by friends, relatives, or neighbors when they 
return home. Certainly, this channel is difficult to capture in remittance reports.
ISSUES ON MIGRANT WORKERS STATISTICS13
Governance of migration includes management of a database which depicts the 
reality of in- and outmigration. Regular and consistently collected data which is 
publicly accessible will enable research institutes and civil society organizations 
12 Unfortunately, PT Pos Indonesia only keeps remittance data from Western Union for one year. Data from more 
than one year is automatically deleted from the system.
13 See Bachtiar (2012) for the shorter version of this subchapter. 
Table 14. Remittance transfer through Western Union and through banks (Rp million)
Remittance Reports
from Western Union
Remittance Reports from Banks 
Lombok Barat
and Mataram City
Lombok Tengah
Oct-09
Nov-09
Dec-09
Jan-10
Feb-10
Mar-10
Apr-10
May-10
Jun-10
Jul-10
Aug-10
Sep-10
17,929.70
21,652.33
22,286.83
21,881.47
20,541.47
21,787.10
23,029.03
23,364.85
23,831.73
25,971.98
32,366.69
29,311.26
26,768.58
30,350.91
31,194.20
22,064.15
20,186.55
28,743.49
20,577.76
23,437.93
21,201.31
20,480.97
36,441.10
18,737.45
681.52
1,012.99
999.72
1,106.80
613.71
1,028.67
867.04
582.43
803.05
957.99
1,405.20
929.88
Source: PT Pos Indonesia Mataram (2010); Kantor Bank Indonesia Mataram (2010)
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to supply policymakers with robust evidence and analyses of effective protection 
regulations for migrant workers. However, the absence of a timely and accurate 
 database is not a unique experience to Indonesia since migration data is only 
available in a minority of developed economies (Hugo 2006), and if available, its 
overall process at the international level remains unreliable (Adams 2003).
Nevertheless, Indonesian emigration statistics have been particularly 
criticized by some scholars. Ananta and Arifin (2008), for example, pointed out 
that the statistics were biased toward low-skilled workers and were far from 
accurate. Meanwhile, Sukamdi (2008) echoed that the population census had 
focused more on internal mobility of people and therefore had failed to capture 
the issue of international migration, except for those born outside the country. 
Moreover, there are several reasons why Indonesian emigration statistics 
are rather disorganized. On one hand, there are too many government institutions 
collecting migrant workers’ data and therefore a simple summation would result 
in double counting. On the other hand, those working abroad for the second time 
or are employed independently, not to mention undocumented migrants, are 
examples of cases showing that statistics are understated.
Data collected by the ministries and national agencies
In general, the Ministry of Labor and Transmigration (Kemnakertrans) and 
BNP2TKI are the two main institutions with the mandate to collect data on 
outmigration. A power struggle between the two influences the availability of 
outmigration statistics.
According to Law No. 39/2004 (Article 22), one of the responsibilities of 
PPTKIS is to collect data on migrants. Law No. 39/2004 (Articles 12 and 13) 
states that PPTKIS must get a permit from Kemnakertrans and renew the permit 
every five years upon completing the requirements. Article 14 of the law specifies 
that one of the requirements is to submit a report periodically to Kemnakertrans.14 
Hence, Kemnakertrans should be powerful enough to force every PPTKIS to 
release the specified data of the workers at regular intervals.
However, Kemnakertrans is not willing to exercise its power to gather data 
from individual PPTKIS and insurance companies.15 If at all, it gets only the 
annual headcount of outmigration. Worse, it requires data only when cases facing 
workers arise. 
On the other hand, BNP2TKI has become the most prepared data-
collecting institution even though Law No. 39/2004 does not explicitly state 
14 Source of Kemnakertrans data can also be the insurance company. Kemnakertrans should be able to 
request individual data from the insurance company periodically because the appointment of the company is 
Kemnakertrans’ authority.
15 Interview with Annie, staff of Kemnakertrans (female, about 50 years old), on January 20, 2012.
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that keeping data is BNP2TKI’s responsibility. As a vertical agency, BNP2TKI 
has 19 provincial representatives, or the so-called BP3TKI, and 14 small district 
posts called Post for Placement and Protection Services of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers (P4TKI). BNP2TKI keeps the border statistics collected at the point of 
departure based on report from BP3TKI. It also gathers information at the point of 
entry back home, namely, Terminal 4 Selapajang Tangerang as well as the airports 
of major sending provinces. 
With all these facilities, BNP2TKI does not update the emigration data 
regularly, even the most basic headcount data. Worse, the time lag of data release 
can reach more than one year. Meanwhile, individual data is neither analyzed nor 
made publicly accessible. 
In addition to Kemnakertrans and BNP2TKI, other ministerial institutions 
that collect data are: (i) the Ministry of Transportation (Kemenhub); (ii) the 
Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemkumham); and (iii) the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Kemlu). Kemenhub keeps data specifically on sailors and workers 
for commercial ships. However, it is not clear whether data from Kemenhub is 
accommodated in overall annual national data. Kemkumham definitely keeps the 
records of the workers that come from the immigration offices. Because migrant 
workers’ passports are different from common peoples’, the immigration offices 
are able to generate the migrants database. Kemlu is assumed to receive data 
from the Indonesian Embassy. Law No. 39/2004 (Article 71) instructs PPTKIS to 
report the arrival of the migrants to the Indonesian Embassy. The latter then holds 
a database of migrant workers to be submitted to the Kemlu.
Meanwhile, Indonesian Statistics (BPS) conduct village potential census 
(Podes) every three years. Since 2005, Podes has included a single question on 
the number of workers abroad. So, statistics of migrants in every village have 
appeared in Podes 2005, 2008, and 2011.
Data collected by subnational governments
Table 15 summarizes various government institutions collecting migrant workers’ 
data. At the provincial level, the BP3TKI is the key actor in data collection. 
Individual data is generated from the overseas employment ID card (KTKLN) and 
predeparture training (PAP). Both have been the responsibilities of the BP3TKI. 
The provincial Labor and Transmigration Office (Disnakertrans) also has its 
own statistics which come from either the report of the PPTKIS located in the 
province or simply a copy of the BP3TKI report. One can also gather information 
from immigration offices at the subnational level.16 At the district level, the 
16 The subnational level of the immigration office does not necessarily correspond with that of the administration 
level. Thus, an immigration office might have one or more immigration office(s). 
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Disnakertrans keeps its own record, which is generated from workers asking for 
a passport recommendation. Under Law No. 39/2004 (Article 51, Illumination 
f), the immigration office can only issue passports for migrants upon submission 
of the recommendation from Disnakertrans at the district level.17
Quality of data
The quality of data is inherently problematic. Too many institutions are collecting 
data, and each set is partial, incomplete, and probably overlaps. This has raised the 
issue of data harmonization. For example, the outflow figure at the provincial level 
is simply added up to get the national record while workers might be registered 
not only in the original province but also at the transit area, i.e., at the location of 
the PPTKIS. At the same time, the figure only reflects the national record and has 
little to do with the provincial one. 
One example is Jakarta, in which majority of the PPTKIS are located, appears 
to be the highest contributor of workers.18 Nunukan of East Kalimantan province 
and Tanjung Pinang of Kepulauan Riau are among the biggest placement units for 
workers heading to Malaysia. But this does not mean that the overseas workers 
come from these provinces. The reality is workers come from one province but 
leave the country from another province, and their statistics are counted from the 
embarkation point. In this case, calculation based on province might not reflect 
the real condition of workers’ provincial origin. 
17 This requirement is interpreted differently by the immigration office. Interview with the official from the immigration 
office of Madiun Region (Rudi, male, 50 years old, on June 29, 2010) revealed that the recommendation can come 
from the district Disnakertrans where the PPTKIS is located and not necessarily from the district Disnakertrans 
where the migrant is domiciled. 
18 According to the informant from PPTKIS association, about 90 percent of workers that PPTKIS sends to the 
Middle East are located in Jakarta (male, about 50 years old, December 15, 2009).
Table 15. Institutions collecting data of migrant workers
Level of Authority Agency in Charge Source of Data
Destination country Indonesian Embassy Report of PPTKIS, Report of migrants
National level Kemnakertrans
BNP2TKI
Kemhub
Kemkumham
Kemlu
BPS
Report of PPTKIS, Report of insurance company
Report from BP3TKI
Report of sailors/workers in commercial ships
Report from immigration offices at the provincial 
level
Indonesian Embassy
village potential census (Podes)
Provincial level BP3TKI
Provincial Disnakertrans 
Immigration office
Report of PAP, KTKLN
Report of PPTKIS, report of BP3TKI
Migrant workers’ passports
District level District Disnakertrans Passport recommendation, report of PPTKIS, 
report of BP3TKI
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This phenomenon also takes place at the provincial level when calculation is 
disaggregated based on district outflow. It appears that the provincial capital, such 
as Kupang District and Lombok Barat District, also has a much higher number 
of migrants than the rest of the districts simply because these are where PPTKIS 
or branch of PPTKIS is located. Thus, workers come from one district but are 
registered in another district.19 
If the workers are counted in the embarkation point, such as Jakarta, 
Nunukan, and Tanjung Pinang (across province) or in the capital city of the 
province (across districts within one province) while at the same time they are 
also counted in their origin districts, we could expect a double-counting statistics 
to take place. This could be serious if it involves major destination countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. To avoid double counting, the solution is to 
have the village-level data. This is provided by the Statistics Indonesia. Podes 
data, which includes overseas workers, is started in 2005, and every three years 
afterwards included a single question on the number of workers abroad. Podes 
data is generated from the interview with the village head. By and large, it relies 
on the memory of the village leader rather than on hard evidence. Although the 
question is about the stock of emigrants, the village head might confuse it with 
the flow. This helps clarify why, in the total stock of migrant workers, the number 
reached only 1,117,816 in 2005 and 1,362,363 in 2008. In comparison, the 
estimate of Kemnakertrans amounted to six million (Hugo 2009), and that of the 
Bank Indonesia, 4.0 million. To overcome this, Podes should, if possible, include 
both the questions of stock and flow of overseas workers.
Since Podes can only produce records every three years, we suggest that 
Statistics Indonesia also collect basic statistics on migrant workers. The National 
Labor Survey (Sakernas) conducted quarterly should include some questions 
relevant to working abroad, and this would not be difficult. This way, Sakernas 
integrates overseas labor market statistics with the domestic one. Statistics 
Indonesia must also conduct analyses and release information to the public. The 
benefits are threefolds: (i) the data is timely and publicly available; (ii) estimate 
can be made at least for provinces and the national level; and (iii) estimate 
includes the contract workers leaving for the second and third times, irregular/
undocumented workers, as well as professional workers that are not captured by 
the present statistics. 
Ultimately, statistics are not the goal but the means and tools for better 
management of international migration. Improvement of overseas workers’ 
governance encompasses many aspects, one of which is improvement of the 
19 At the provincial level, there is also discrepancy between statistics made by BP3TKI and Disnakertrans. 
The first bases its statistics on number of workers with KTKLN and the latter on number of workers asking for 
Disnakertrans recommendation for passport application.
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statistics. Limitations of emigration statistics and access to them have imposed a 
major constraint in research efforts. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
We observed the more complex phenomena of international migration. The 
most tangible one is deployment volatility as a consequence of government 
policy and economic shock both at the origin as well as the destination 
countries. Volatility makes it more difficult to understand trends over a longer 
period. Complexity is intensified by the fact that volatility could simply be 
a matter of recording system. This is a serious issue since governance of 
migration includes the management of a database that should be regular and 
consistently collected and be made publicly accessible. Although data has 
been collected by various government institutions, efforts to integrate them 
are still lacking. 
Other phenomena such as changing destination and expanding destination 
countries bring with them the need for a higher level of government responsibilities 
in protecting the overseas workers. Again, the planning and budgeting for proper 
protection will only be possible if data is available. Hence, a strong call for 
improvement in the recording system is needed. 
As there have been many cases facing domestic workers lately, the 
government enforced moratorium which intensified the volatility of deployment. 
Indeed, moratorium has characterized the international migration in Indonesia in 
the last four years particularly because domestic workers make up a lion’s share 
of overseas workers’ dispatch.
At the subnational level, the migrants in East Java and West Nusa Tenggara 
were affected differently by the financial crisis and moratorium due to different 
occupational structure. From the remittance point of view, the sending districts 
receive more significant value of remittances compared to GRDP and Local 
Government Budget, which implies considerable potential of remittance for 
local development. Therefore, local governments in sending areas need to work 
more closely in facilitating and protecting the workers so that working overseas 
is truly beneficial to the workers, their family, and the society. 
Finally, taking into account significant scale of undocumented/irregular 
migrant workers, we recommend that the Statistics Indonesia conduct a nationally 
representative household survey covering relevant information on emigration, 
including workers’ profile such as gender, age, address, profession, education, 
wage, and destination country. The survey should incorporate workers that are 
preparing to depart, working, and have finished their work contract.
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APPENDIX
List of host countries based on BNP2TKI statistics of returned migrants (2008–2011)
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Angola
Aruba
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Brazil
Bangladesh
British Indian Ocean Territory
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Canada
Central African Republic
Chile
China
Congo
Croatia (Hrvatska)
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Estonia
Fiji Islands
France
Gambia
Germany
Greece
Heard Island and McDonald Islands
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kiribati
Kenya
Korea
Korea Selatan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Macao SAR
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Mali
Mauritius
Mauritania
Mayotte
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
San Marino
Saudi Arabia
Serbia and Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
United States Minor Outlying Islands
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Source: BNP2TKI (2011) 
